Moral Disagreement Definition

Perhaps surprising, but also a little intuitive when you think about it, highly educated or intelligent people tend to be much more ideological than the general public. Rather, they are partisan, obsessed with moral and political cause, or use an intellectual framework or idealized model to interpret the world. As I reject premise 1, I can afford not to speak of Tersmans (2006, chap. 4) Discussion on Wright`s dilemma (for the realist), of which one horn is premise 1, the other an obligation of some sort of incompatibility of moral truths. Now, moralist realists can recognize it consistently and then argue against naturalism – perhaps, at least in part, on the grounds that naturalism is incompatible with the recognition of moral facts. That was Indeed Moore`s position. But then you have the burden of explaining how moral facts are related to natural facts, and explaining how we could learn from these unsealed facts. Much of the work done to defend moral realism is devoted either to the use of these charges or to proof that they do not pose a particular problem solely for morality. Moral realists of this kind allow moral facts not to be natural facts, and moral knowledge is not merely a piece of scientific knowledge, even if they defend the idea that there are moral facts and (at least in principle) moral knowledge.

They therefore reject the idea that science is the measure and test of everything (Shafer-Landau 2003, Parfit 2011, Scanlon 2014). Railton (1993, p. 281) takes this as a reason for not interpreting “the” argument of disagreement in this sense. For example, we are pleased to think that if we disagree, present facts or statistics, or use rational standards, we could help create common ground on which we can build. In reality, calls for such supposedly objective criteria often polarize people more when no commonality is already established. Tersman, Folke. Moral disagreements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. However, the debate between moral and anti-realistic realists assumes that there is a common object of inquiry – in this case, a series of assertions that all parties concerned want to recognize as moral requirements – on which two questions can be raised and answered: do these allegations purport to point to facts in which they are true or false? Are any of them true? Moral realists answer “yes” to both, non-cognitivists answer “no” to the first (and by default “no” to the second), while error theorists answer “yes” to the first and “no” to the second. (With the introduction of “minimalism” on truth and facts, things get a little more complicated.